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Abstract
During the Danish cartoons controversy in 2005–2006, a group of ambassadors to
Denmark representing eleven predominantly Muslim countries requested a meeting
with the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to protest against the
cartoons. Rasmussen interpreted their viewpoint as one of demanding limits to freedom
of speech and he ignored their request for a meeting. Drawing on this case study, the
article argues that it is an appropriate, and potentially effective, moral criticism of
anyone who is in a position of political power—taking into account reasonable
constraints of feasibility and practicality—that they have refused to receive informa-
tion, ideas, or opinions from individuals, or their representatives, with dissenting
viewpoints. The article also articulates one possible theoretical ground for such a moral
criticism: that they could be violating a fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right of
people to submit information, ideas, or opinions to those who wield power over them
and to be meaningfully heard—a right which can span state borders.
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Introduction
During the Danish cartoons controversy in 2005–2006, a group of ambassadors to
Denmark representing eleven predominantly Muslim countries requested a meeting
with the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to protest against the
cartoons. Rasmussen interpreted their viewpoint as one of demanding limits to freedom
of speech and he ignored their request for a meeting. As justification, he proffered the
principled reason that what they apparently wished to question him about—the idea
that freedom of speech has such special importance in Danish society that it warrants
the protection of even the publication of cartoons which are harmful to Muslims—was
beyond questioning. Rasmussen’s choice to refuse to meet with the ambassadors in
person to hear their views in full (or at length) on grounds of the special importance of
freedom of speech might seem to involve a form of paradox, double-thinking, or
hypocrisy. If free speech is of special importance, is this not also the case when the
speech concerns the question of the limits of freedom of speech itself?
This article takes as its starting point an intuition that, we believe, some people may
have had about Rasmussen’s choice. Whilst recognizing that Rasmussen did hear the
ambassadors’ initial grievance (by reading the letter submitted to him) and did provide
one means of submitting information to him (by receiving the letter submitted to him),
there was something nevertheless morally problematic about his decision to refuse to
meet the ambassadors in person to hear their concerns in full (or at length).
Based on this, we consider one possible way of making sense of this intuition—a way
that departs from the simple idea that it involved a paradox of free speech. This way
involves combining aspects of cosmopolitan political theory, deliberative approaches to
democratic theory, diplomatic communication theory, and discourse theory. In particu-
lar, we draw on the deliberative, diplomatic and discursive virtues of openness, inclu-
siveness, equality or parity, translation, and access, which we extend to contexts of
international political interaction and communication. We argue that, ultimately,
Rasmussen’s choice may have involved the partial violation of a fundamental
(cosmopolitan) moral right: the right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to those
who wield power over oneself, even across borders, and to be meaningfully heard.
The remainder of the article unfolds like this. The next section describes in more
detail the nature and context of Rasmussen’s choice and articulates more fully the
charge that Rasmussen’s choice not to engage in direct or face-to-face talks with the
ambassadors on grounds of the special importance of freedom of speech was in effect a
denial of the very grounds being offered for refusing to speak.
Following on from that, and in order to lay the conceptual groundwork for our own
moral diagnosis of Rasmussen’s choice, we briefly outline some insights from cosmo-
politan political theory, deliberative approaches to democratic theory, diplomatic
communication theory, and discourse theory.
We then make the argument that Rasmussen partially violated a fundamental
(cosmopolitan) moral right to be meaningfully heard on the part of those Muslims
adversely affected by the cartoons, including Muslims living in other countries. In this
article, we do not have space to provide a full theory of what such a right would
involve. Rather, our claim is that such a right can account for the initial intuition. This
opens up a broader research agenda in diplomatic ethics as well in cosmopolitan
deliberative and communicative rights, which we can only begin in this article.
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In the final section, we explore more recent developments in the Danish cartoons
controversy and then consider the implications of conventional practices of interna-
tional diplomacy for our arguments about the right to be meaningfully heard.
Rasmussen’s Choice
Restrictive policies regarding immigration had been the winning card for the Danish
centre-right government headed since 2001 by Prime Minister Rasmussen. The policies
were also important in maintaining the parliamentary support of the Danish People’s
Party (Lægaard 2013: 176–184). Simultaneously, immigration was increasingly under-
stood within Danish society as being about Muslims and was seen in the frame of the
war against terror (ibid).
In this context, a more general critical tone against strands of Islam perceived as
obstacles to integration had become mainstream in Denmark.
Jyllands-Posten is one of the largest national newspapers in Denmark. It had long been
the main outlet for critical views of Islam in Denmark and strongly backed the Rasmussen
government’s line on immigration in general and on political correctness in particular.
During the summer of 2005, stories ran in the Danish media involving apparent
political correctness towards Muslims and Islam. One featured a children’s books
author, Kåre Bluitgen, who wanted to publish a children’s book about the prophet
Muhammad. Bluitgen was both a left-wing proponent of multiculturalism and a critic
of some of the shadier sides of the Danish multicultural reality, including lack of
contact between most Danes and Muslims and repressive aspects of Muslim commu-
nities. The story was that Bluitgen had not been able to find an illustrator for the book.
The editorial team of Jyllands-Posten picked up on this and other stories apparently
showing anxiety about offending Muslims. The newspaper decided to run what was
supposed to be a kind of experiment testing the degree of self-censorship among
political cartoonists, a statement supporting free speech, and a deliberate attempt to
take a stand against political correctness. Culture Editor Fleming Rose got the job of
soliciting the cartoons as well as writing the accompanying text. A former correspon-
dent to Moscow, Rose viewed free speech as a cornerstone of liberal democracy and
self-censorship as the hallmark of a totalitarian society.
The twelve cartoons, which resulted, were printed on 30 September 2005 together
with Rose’s text. According to Rose, there are increasing pressures towards self-
censorship in Western societies, especially when it comes to questions about Islam
and Muslims, some of whom demand special treatment and consideration of their
religious sensibilities. He continued:
This is incompatible with a secular democracy and free speech, where one must
be ready to put up with ridicule, mockery and derision. (Rose 2005, authors’
translation)
In the present article, we will not cover the entire train of events that unfolded following
the publication of the cartoons. We will focus on one specific incident that took place
shortly after the publication, but which came to epitomize the principled disagreements
at the centre of the Danish cartoons controversy.
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Shortly after the publication, the Egyptian Government, which was facing the
Muslim Brotherhood in an upcoming general election and arguably needed a way of
presenting itself as a true protector of Islam, initiated a diplomatic offensive against
Denmark (Klausen 2009, ch 2). On 12 October 2005, the diplomatic representatives of
eleven predominantly Muslim countries sent a letter to Prime Minister Rasmussen. The
letter mentioned the Jyllands-Posten cartoons as only the most recent and egregious
example of ‘an on-going smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against
Islam and Muslims’. (The letter is quoted in full in Klausen (2009, 36–37).) The
representatives saw the cartoons and similar expressions as contrary to values of
tolerance and human rights and warned that they could cause adverse reactions in
Muslim countries and among Muslims in Europe. The representatives urged the Prime
Minister to ‘take all those responsible to task under law of the land’ (sic). They further
requested an urgent meeting and asked for an early response. Shortly after the letter
from the ambassadors, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) sent a similar
letter (Klausen 2009, 65, 147).
Since much of the subsequent public debate focused on the need for an apology, it
deserves mention that neither letter included a demand for an apology from the
government (Klausen 2009, 32–33, 65). That did not prevent OIC and many predom-
inantly Muslim countries from subsequently making the lack of an apology the
justification for the boycott against Denmark that ensued in 2006.
Prime Minister Rasmussen responded to the ambassadors on 21 October 2005. His
reply did not acknowledge or address the request for a meeting at all, but rather focused
on the demand that he ‘take all those responsible to task under law of the land’:
The Danish society is based on respect for the freedom of expression, on religious
tolerance and on equal standards for all religions. The freedom of expression is
the very foundation of the Danish democracy. The freedom of expression has a
wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press.
However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of a blasphemous or
discriminatory nature. The offended party may bring such acts or expressions to
court, and it is for the courts to decide in individual cases. (The letter is quoted in
full in Klausen 2009, 66)
Subsequently, Rasmussen on several occasions reaffirmed the claims made in the reply
to the ambassadors (Klausen 2009, 148).
There are a couple of noteworthy points about Rasmussen’s reply. For one thing,
there are actually several inaccuracies in his depiction of the Danish legal reality. One
might question or at least wish for a qualification of Rasmussen’s claim that Danish
society is based on ‘equal standards for all religions’, given the fact that Denmark has
an established Church and Rasmussen himself, his Venstre party, and his government
have often invoked the slogan that in Denmark there is freedom of religion but not
religious equality (Lægaard 2012). Furthermore, whilst it is true that the Danish penal
code at the time included both laws against blasphemy and hate speech (Lægaard
2007),1 it is actually not true that ‘The offended party may bring such acts or
1 The Danish blasphemy clause was abolished in 2017.
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expressions to court’. Both laws are about public order, and so legal cases can only be
raised in relation to these laws by the public prosecutor, not by individual claimants.
The cartoons were in fact subsequently reported to the police, so the public
prosecutor had to decide whether to raise charges. Ultimately, the prosecutor, it
appears, engaged in a thorough investigation of the cartoons in light of the laws against
hate speech and blasphemy and eventually decided that the cartoons did not seem to
constitute a violation (Lægaard 2007).
Setting these inaccuracies aside, the appeal in the Prime Minister’s reply is clearly
and unequivocally to the value of freedom of speech. But what, more specifically, of
his failure to even acknowledge the ambassadors’ request for a meeting and his choice
not to meet with them? In reality, the rationale could have been practical (a busy
schedule), political (not wishing to be seen to be pandering to Muslim countries), and/
or ideological (based on Danish values, including not least freedom of speech). But, as
reported in the Copenhagen Post, Rasmussen himself offered the following ideological
basis for his choice.
This is a matter of principle. I won’t meet with them because it is so crystal clear
what principles Danish democracy is built upon that there is no reason to do so.
(Comments from Copenhagen Post, quoted in Ammitzbøll and Vidino 2007)
In other words, if it is self-evident that Danish society is based on respect for freedom
of speech, then what would be the point of meeting to explain this to the ambassadors?
In the subsequent debate, however, Rasmussen’s reply was most often linked to the
issue of an official apology (or lack thereof) by the government for the fact of the
publication of the cartoons. The letter sent by the OIC, for example, omitted the request
to ‘take all those responsible to task under law of the land’ (Klausen 2009, 147),
suggesting a shift of emphasis away from a request for legal intervention to the need for
a government apology.
In this context, Rasmussen continued to insist that the government cannot apologize
for an act committed by a private newspaper, since the newspaper is independent of the
government and has its freedom of speech, which means that the government neither
has responsibility for the publication nor could do anything about it.
That being said Rasmussen did not ignore or downplay the seriousness of the
ensuing diplomatic crisis caused by the cartoons. Nor could he: Rasmussen’s own
effigy was burnt in cities in several Muslim countries. And so, during the height of the
crisis in February 2006, for example, The Times reported Rasmussen as saying that the
cartoons furore was ‘Denmark’s worst international relations incident since the Second
World War’ (The Times 2006).
Furthermore, Rasmussen, at the time, added that he personally would not publish
anything that might offend people’s religious sensibilities (Klausen 2009, 148). In an
interview with Al Arabiya in February 2006, Rasmussen even condemned expressions
that offend religious sensibilities or demonize people on the grounds of their religion.
Rasmussen accordingly distinguished sharply between defending freedom of speech in
general and endorsing particular utterances protected by freedom of speech, such as the
cartoons.
In what follows, we shall use the term ‘Rasmussen’s choice’ to refer exclusively to
Rasmussen’s choice not to meet with the ambassadors in person to hear their views on
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the cartoons in full (or at length).2 This is separate from any other, related choices
Rasmussen did make, or could have made, concerning the publication of the cartoons
themselves.
Cosmopolitan Democratic and Communicative Rights
There is a possible analysis of Rasmussen’s dismissal of the ambassadors’ overtures
that understands and locates this sort of behaviour within Denmark’s potential ‘com-
plicity’, along with other northern European states, in much wider patterns, forms, and
structures of postcolonialism perpetrated by the West, including economic and cultural
postcolonialism, not only across the world but also in some Muslim countries. For
example, Mulinari et al. highlight
the manifold ways in which North-European countries have taken, and continue
to take, part in (post)colonial processes. The lure of an enterprise as powerful and
authoritative as the Western civilising project, attracts even those who never
belonged to its centre or were its main agents. Nations, groups, and individual
subjects are drawn by the promise of power to adopt the discourses, imaginaries
and material benefits connected to this project. The Nordic countries see them-
selves as part of the Western world, drawing their values systems from the
Enlightenment, and showing themselves to be willing to defend these values
sometimes even more forcefully than the former colonial centres. The recent
cartoon affair in Denmark and Sweden is evidence of this willingness. (Mulinari
et al. 2016, 1)
The basic contention here is that, even though Denmark has no colonial past involving
any Muslim countries, Rasmussen’s choice must be understood in terms of a wider
pattern of powerful countries and political leaders imposing Western cultural norms, in
this particular case a certain sort of free speech norm, on people living in other countries
including in the Muslim world. Whilst claims around postcolonialism did not figure
very much in the discussions at the time—perhaps partly because of Denmark’s own
history—some observers did make the point that ‘Muslim sensitivity about insults to
Islam in Europe has a strong postcolonial context’ (Cole 2006).
However, postcolonialism lies not merely in forms of cultural hegemony in which a
culturally diverse world is dominated by singular aspects of Western culture. A related,
but different phenomenon is the way in which political decision-making in the West
often excludes the direct voices of, or communicative inputs from, people who are not
citizens of Western states—many of whom are citizens of former colonies of Western
states—but who are nevertheless affected by that decision-making. This is a broader
argument about cosmopolitan democratic and communicative rights; it is the focus of
this article.
At the heart of many versions of cosmopolitanism is a form of moral egalitarianism
which emphasizes basic human characteristics shared by everyone and that
2 Of course, it is conceivable that the choice was not his; that his security chief, his diary manager, or some
other official ruled out such a meeting. But we shall ignore that possibility here.
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unequivocally rejects ways of ordering the world that are based on a hierarchy of
intrinsic worth or dignity among human beings. Historically, cosmopolitanism as a
political movement has campaigned against forms transnational injustice such as the
slave trade, colonial exploitation, and even global poverty, which seem to be premised
on ranking persons according to higher or lower intrinsic worth.
Importantly for this article, cosmopolitan political theory highlights the fact that
people around the world are affected by governmental agencies, legal jurisdictions, and
systems of rules located in both other countries and international organizations, over
which they exert little or no control. It also embraces the fundamental principle (the all
affected principle) that being affected by the exercise of formal and informal power in
other countries can ground certain cosmopolitan rights or claims. In other words,
certain rights or claims to democracy, equality, justice, benevolence, and so on, extend
beyond state borders (Shapiro 1999, 38; Näsström 2003, 822–825; Held 2005, 246–
249; Gould 2006, 54; Pogge 2008, 37–38).
With respect to issues of democracy in particular, a cosmopolitan approach puts the
emphasis on how accepting the all-affected principle—a principle for delimiting who
should be included in democratic decision-making—can, and should, shape the way
individual states are to think appropriately about the site, scope, and content of
democratic rights and associated democratic decision-making rules and procedures
(Held 2005, 246–249). In the words of Sofia Näsström:
In most theories of democracy one starts out from a given people, only then to
discuss the scope of its decisionmaking: how far should the power of the people
extend? What is the proper domain over which it has a democratic say, and what
should by contrast be considered a more private concern? What is novel about the
all-affected principle is that it turns the question around. It determines the scope
of the people on the basis of the scope of political decision-making. For example,
what is the scope of the decisions made by the Security Council? Or what is the
scope of the decision by a particular nation state to cut down on environmental
protection? The answer is that the people in each case are those affected by the
decision in question. (Näsström 2011, 117)
At first glance, the logic of cosmopolitan theories of democracy would seem to point in
the direction of granting to all people affected by the decisions of a state, even people of
other countries, the same or similar democratic rights to influence the decisions,
including voting rights, for example. As Robert Goodin puts it, this logic seems to
suggest ‘giving virtually everyone everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided
anywhere’ (Goodin 2007, 68). However, this is not only merely implausible but also
wildly impractical. For example, the challenges of voters being well informed enough
and having a sufficient marginal contribution to make voting rational that already exist
at the national level would be exponentially increased if the franchise were extended to
virtually everyone on the planet (Keohane 2003).
One way to soften and render more plausible the potential implications of the all-
affected principle would be to place theoretical limits on the sorts of interests that can
be affected in a way that might give rise to cosmopolitan democratic rights. But then,
the task is to determine what the relevant interests are (Moore 2006, 35). It may be
tempting at this stage to fall back on the idea that the relevant interests are simply the
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body of human rights typically recognized in international law (Gould 2006, 54; Pogge
2008, 37–38). But then, the issue becomes how such law is created and by whom. It is
plausible to suppose that this task itself should not succumb to forms of postcolonialism
and cultural hegemony and must be done through some sort of global democratic
procedure In which case, potentially, the previous challenges are simply moved up one
level.
Fortunately, there is another way to address at least some of these problems. It is to
take a layered approach to democratic rights.3 The layers of a democratic rights
approach starts from the premise that people, often citizens, who are directly governed
by, or subjected to, a national governmental regime or system of law, have a close
connection to each other and to the institutions against which they have democratic
rights. This subjection and closeness give rise to a more expansive set of political
rights, extending from the right to vote in elections and the right to run for office
through to the right to protest and the right to petition, to the right to hold politicians to
account. This subjection and closeness in turn also gives rise to demanding norms of
political communication, meaning some quite stringent obligations on politicians to
submit to political accountability. Arguably, there is a primary obligation on the part of
public officials to make themselves available to answer the questions (an obligation to
avoid stonewalling) and an obligation to respond properly to probing questions includ-
ing where feasible and reasonable to give straight answers (an obligation to avoid
covert question dodging).
However, there is another layer of democratic rights that occurs at the global level.
Here what matters is that people around the world are affected by governmental
agencies, legal jurisdictions, and systems of rules located both in other countries and
in international organizations. The fact of being affected also gives rise to a set of
political rights, but these rights are less expansive than at the national level and do
include many of the rights mentioned above. Instead, they include such fundamental
moral rights as the right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to those who have
the power to take decisions that can have systematic and adverse implications for one’s
vital interests, and to be meaningfully heard. This right in turn gives rise to a
corresponding obligation on the part of powerful institutions and the leaders of those
institutions not only to not merely receive or listen to the information, ideas, and
options submitted but also to meaningfully hear them, such as, if necessary, to hear
them in person and in full (or at length).
These ideas are rooted in a broader tradition of deliberative approaches to theorizing
about global democracy, and, of course, this tradition has much more to say than the
particular sort of communicative cosmopolitan right proposed in this article. For
example, some writers in this tradition put to the forefront the importance of certain
deliberative virtues that cut across borders. For example, John Rawls in The Law of
Peoples highlights what he calls ‘the duty of civility’ on the part of liberal peoples,
‘requiring that they offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of
Peoples for their actions’ (Rawls 1999, 59). This idea has prompted a debate in the
literature about what a theory of global public reasons should look like (Brown 2010;
Smith 2011; Porter 2012; Williams 2017). Others underscore the value and necessity of
3 Inspiration for this view comes from a similar proposal in the field of global distributive justice. See Wolff
(2009).
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transnational discursive and deliberative arenas, a sort of transnational public sphere,
partly consisting of the media and organized civil society (Dryzek 2000; Steffek 2010;
Dryzek et al. 2019).
Nevertheless, one important feature we take from this tradition is the deliberative
virtue of inclusiveness, meaning a disposition to uphold the principle that people should
be part of the deliberative processes of decision-making which lead to decisions being
formed elsewhere in the world but which nevertheless affect them. In other words, if
deliberative agents are people with a right to be involved in democratic decision-
making and associated exercises of power or at the very least are people whose
deliberations are something to which that decision-making and exercises of power
should be responsive, then the status of deliberative agent should be afforded to
members of ‘stakeholder communities’, meaning all those individuals whose autono-
mous capacities are constrained by the results of that democratic decision-making and
exercises of power (Macdonald 2008).
Another tradition we borrow from is that of cosmopolitan approaches to discourse
theory, which have the potential to furnish a more comprehensive account of the sorts
of virtues public discourse at the international level should have. A key feature of
discourse theory is inclusiveness: that ‘only those action norms are valid to which all
possibly affected persons agree as participants in rational discourses’ (Habermas 1996,
107).
If inclusiveness refers to who the participants can be, another virtue speaks to how
the participants are to treat each other. For example, discourse agents ‘should grant each
other equal discursive rights, avoid overt or covert coercion, speak their minds sincere-
ly, and let all those who could contribute to the discussion partake in it’ (Gilabert 2006,
17). Moreover, ‘all interlocutors must, in principle, enjoy roughly equal chances to state
their views, place issues on the agenda, question the tacit and explicit assumptions of
others, switch levels as needed and generally receive a fair hearing’ (Fraser 2007, 20).
Nancy Fraser (2007) situates this second virtue of equality, what she calls ‘parity’ of
discursive participation among all affected persons, within a context of global inter-
connectedness. Her ideal is for the powerful—a mix of national and international,
public and private, powers—to be held accountable to, and to be participants in, public
discussions within national and transnational public spheres and for those public
discussions to exemplify parity as well as inclusiveness.
Finally, diplomatic communication theory emphasizes the ways in which contem-
porary diplomatic interactions are increasingly oriented around intercultural commu-
nication (Rossow 1962). Whereas once upon a time diplomacy may have been
dominated by interactions between diplomats and government ministers belonging to
the same Judeo Christian family of cultures, in the twentieth century, this European-
centred diplomatic structure has given way to a more complicated and inclusive picture
of cross-cultural interactions across the globe (Belay 1997). As a result, it is arguable
that ‘[p]recisely and quite simply, the professional service rendered by the diplomat is
the minimizing of distortion and friction in cross-cultural communications and oper-
ations’ (Rossow 1962, 563).
To perform this task, the diplomat must be able to get under the skin of other
cultures, to understand, learn, and interpret them in ways that can better enable him or
her to reduce misunderstandings between other cultures and the political leaders he or
she serves. In that sense, access to face-to-face meetings is a crucial precondition of
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diplomatic, intercultural communication. Without access to some of the more complex
cognitive and noncognitive mental states exemplified in thought processes of, and
subtle nuances of positions taken by, the leaders of other countries, diplomatic com-
munication cannot serve its core purpose of helping ‘to reduce unnecessary conflict and
misunderstanding, and to assure that issues are at least clear and real, and not based on
phantom, myth, or mismatched codes’ (Rossow 1962, 575).
In the next section, we explore the sense in which Rasmussen’s dismissal of the
ambassadors’ overtures might be understood as evidence of a failure to cultivate or
displays these virtues of deliberative, discursive, and diplomatic communication (in-
clusiveness, equality or parity, intercultural interpretation, access).
The Right to Be Heard, Even Across Borders
We are interested instead in circumstances in which, although a government, or its
leadership, has not refused an airing of an opinion among the public, it has nevertheless
itself refused to hear or receive that opinion in full (or at length) and in person. By
refusing direct representations on matters affecting the vital interests of people whose
representatives are seeking to make representations, such as a group of ambassadors
seeking to give voice to the concerns of other cultures, a government might be violating
a fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right. This is the right to submit information, ideas,
and opinions to those who wield power over oneself, that is, the power to take decisions
that can have systematic and adverse implications for one’s vital interests, even when
that decision-making power and its implications flow across borders, and to have them
meaningfully heard. We consider this right because it could explain the wrongness of
Rasmussen’s choice by understanding the choice as having an inherently international
dimension.
As we understand it, the fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right to submit infor-
mation, ideas, or opinions, and to be meaningfully heard, is related to, but not identical
with, the fundamental political right to petition one’s own government. The latter right,
in the most abstract sense, imposes a duty on government to receive and respond to
petitions made by its citizens, including a qualified duty of neutrality which prohibits a
government from engaging in content and viewpoint discrimination over what infor-
mation, ideas, or opinions it will receive and from whom, absent a sufficient rationale
for such discrimination. For reasons of feasibility and practicality, the right tends not to
extend to meeting the government in person. Instead, it can mean that if citizens collect
a given number of signatures, including digitally in the case of electronic petitions (or
e-petitions), the government has a duty to respond to the petition. Importantly, the
moral basis for this fundamental political right partly consists in basic norms of
democratic representation. A government composed of elected representatives who
refuse to receive petitions from the very people they are supposed to represent arguably
serves its representative function less strongly than one whose elected representatives
freely accept petitions.
The fundamental political right to petition one’s own government is realized in
different ways and, to varying extents, in constitutional rights and human rights around
the world (Krotoszynski 2012, ch 4). The English Bill of Rights of 1689, for example,
provides for the rights of subjects to petition the monarch, making prosecutions for
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such petitioning illegal. The right to petition can also be found in the last clause of the
First Amendment: ‘Congress shall make no law […] abridging […] the right of the
people to freely assemble and petition government for a redress of grievances’. This in
turn ‘stem[med] from the right to petition local assemblies in colonial America’
(Higginson 1986, 142). It is also found in Article 17 of the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany and in Article 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, which provide for the right to petition to the European Parliament.
Abstracting from these particular settings, we can say that if a prime minister of a
country, which respects the constitutional right to petition, had refused to hear a
grievance from a significant number of citizens, then the contradiction would have
taken this form: refusing to hear a grievance on grounds of the special place of freedom
of speech in the society but thereby violating a right that is also bound up with freedom
of speech in that society, namely, the right to petition one’s own government. As we
have said, this right can be grounded in basic norms of representative democracy. We
also think that the right to be heard, held by citizens against their own governments,
implicates important questions about democratic legitimacy. Denying citizens the
chance to submit information, ideas, and opinions to their own governments lessens
the ability of citizens to directly influence both the broad shape of legislative agendas
and the particular content of governmental decisions, which in turn can reduce the
legitimacy of downstream laws and, potentially, the legitimacy of the political system
as a whole.4
Rasmussen’s choice was not a decision to refuse to meet in person with a group of
Danish-Muslim citizens but a decision not to meet with a group of ambassadors from
other countries. Indeed, in his letter to the delegation Rasmussen writes:
I share your view that dialogue between cultures and religions needs to be based
on mutual respect and understanding. There is indeed room for increasing mutual
understanding between different cultures and religions.
In this regard, I have personally taken the initiative to enter into a dialogue with
representatives from the Muslim communities in Denmark. (Klausen 2009, 66)
However, it is precisely for the reason that Rasmussen refused to meet with the
delegation of foreign ambassadors (but not Danish-Muslims)—and in order to find
an argument that can capture the original intuition about Rasmussen’s choice—we
revert back to the even more fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right to submit
information, ideas, and opinions to those who wield power over oneself, and to have
them meaningfully heard. This right is held by individuals against governments who
possess the power to make decisions that can have systematic and adverse implications
for their vital interests. If someone has this fundamental moral right in relation to a
particular government, then that government should make it possible for that person to
submit information, ideas, and opinions to it and to meaningfully hear that information,
4 Denmark is one of only a handful of European countries that do not recognize the constitutional right of
citizens to directly petition the government (European Union 2015, 12). Section 54 of the Danish Constitution
of 1953 only provides a limited right to petition. It states: ‘Petitions may be submitted to the Folketing
[parliament] only through one of its Members.’ http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/My_
Constitutional_Act_with_explanations/Chapter%205.aspx (accessed 29 June 2020).
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ideas, and opinions, whilst accepting reasonable constraints of feasibility and
practicality.
At the level of deep values, we suggest that the fundamental moral right to be heard
is linked to issues of democratic legitimacy in the case of citizens wishing to be heard,
but linked instead to norms of responsible state behaviour in the case of noncitizens (or
citizens of other states). Legitimacy in the domestic context is about government
decisions being responsive to facts about the impact of those decisions on citizens.
But government decisions can also systematically and adversely affect the vital inter-
ests of people outside the state or noncitizens. Whilst there may be differences in kind
and degree here, we believe that just as legitimacy is partly a matter of the willingness
of a government to listen to its citizens, so a responsible government is partly one that
fulfils certain roles in the international state system including being responsive to the
effects of its decisions beyond its own borders.
No doubt similar claims could be made about other agents than states—for example,
transnational corporations—who also exercise power in ways that affect the vital
interests of people. This might on the one hand mean that our argument also has
implications for such nonstate actors. This is not necessarily an unreasonable implica-
tion, but it is beyond the present study to investigate this. On the other hand, state
power is widely recognized as different from other sorts of power, which justifies our
focus on states in this article; so we shall assume for the sake of argument.
At a more concrete level, the fundamental moral right to be heard can, and often
should, be realized differently for citizens and noncitizens. In the context of domestic
politics, the moral right to be heard is realized through the political right of citizens to
petition their governments. For reasons of feasibility and practicality, the corresponding
duty can be reasonably viewed as being discharged by systems of e-petitions in which
any group of citizen petitioners must secure a minimum threshold of electronic
signatures before the government is required to respond. But whereas the political right
to petition is a bounded right for citizens, the moral right to be heard creates an
unbounded duty in the case of noncitizens in international contexts. Nevertheless, once
again for reasons of feasibility and practicality, in the case of noncitizens the moral
right to be heard might be realized through the institution of international diplomacy.
We propose that in the case of the Muslim ambassadors and, more importantly,
those they represented, the fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right to be meaningfully
heard created a cosmopolitan moral duty on the part of Rasmussen, as the senior
representative of the Danish government, to meet with the ambassadors.
Of course, the idea of a right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to those who
hold ‘power’ over those doing the submitting is more complex in the Rasmussen case
for two reasons: first, he does not have unilateral authority to interpret the Danish
constitution or even to launch criminal proceedings, and, second, because, at first
glance, it may not be obvious what coercive power or even informal influence the
Danish government might have over citizens of other states in relation to the Danish
cartoons affair. However, as we shall explain and defend below, we believe that
Rasmussen did, indeed, have both power and influence in ways that sufficed to trigger
the moral rights and obligations we are proposing.
In other words, in order to provide an argument why Rasmussen’s choice was
morally problematic, we suggest that one needs to appeal to a cosmopolitan right,
which creates, in certain contexts, a cosmopolitan duty. This is a cosmopolitan duty in
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the sense that it embodies the core notion that individuals whose vital interests are
systematically and adversely affected by the actions of governments are entitled to have
their interests taken into consideration in some appropriate way irrespective of what
national affiliation they have, even if those governments do not have political authority
over the individuals concerned and even if those individuals have no obligation to obey
the laws and rules promulgated by those governments, such as individuals living in
other countries.
We assume the cosmopolitan duty to have special force or applicability to those in
positions of political power. This is so not merely because they hold a monopoly on the
exercise of at least some forms of coercive power but also because they can have a
special kind of informal power including particular forms of status, authority, and
influence (Brown and Sinclair 2020, ch 7). We do not have space here to discuss
whether the same cosmopolitan duty might also be applicable to those in positions of
economic or social power. One potential difference may be that although private actors
like major newspapers or social media companies, say, are also often powerful, they are
usually one among several actors in a market, or voices in civil society, and as such,
they do not have exactly the same sort of singular or focal authority or influence of a
political leader—an individual who can speak on behalf of, or is perceived to be able to
speak on behalf of, the state or even the nation, for example.
The failure of Rasmussen to meet with the ambassadors in person to receive their
concerns and perspectives in full (or at length) therefore partially violated their
fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to
him and to be meaningfully heard. (A partial violation because he did hear their
grievance, by reading the letters submitted to him, and he did provide one means of
submitting information to him, by receiving the letters submitted to him.)
This violation may not directly implicate domestic issues of democratic legitimacy
or representative democracy or other fundamental norms relating to domestic political
affairs. However, arguably, this violation does raise questions about what it means to be
a good member of the community of states. A responsible state, or the government of a
responsible nation, is arguably one that respects the aforementioned fundamental moral
right. This is because the fundamental moral right to be heard can, and often does,
create cross-border duties. Since foreign citizens have no vote in how a state makes
internal decisions, ambassadors are the primary mechanism of representation. There is
therefore something particularly perverse about failing to meet with ambassadors, given
their crucial role in representing the interests of nonstate citizens.
Of course, whilst some people might be willing to entertain the idea that the Danish
government’s handling of the case of the cartoons did raise issues that could have adversely
affected the vital interests of Muslims in other countries, as well as in Denmark, such as
interests relating to the protection of their civic dignity or cultural identity (Waldron 2010;
Brown 2015, chs 5 and 6), clearly other people might reject this idea out of hand. They
might say that the cartoonsmerely hurt religious sensibilities and that this hurt is not amatter
of vital interests. However, we believe that, even, or perhaps especially, in cases where there
is reasonable disagreement about whether vital interests have been adversely affected, it is
important to allow people who in good faith assert that their vital interests have been
adversely affected to have a voice and to listen to why they think this to be the case.
One objection to our proposal might be that even elected representatives have a right
not to receive certain kinds of information, ideas, or opinions. According to the values
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of militant democracy, for instance (Loewenstein 1937a, 1937b), freedom of speech
matters for reasons of democracy, but sometimes in order to defend democracy against
existential threats, it is justifiable to neutralize those threats by limiting, or refusing to
countenance, anti-democratic speech. Suppose a prominent politician believes that a
certain group of citizens would want to engage in anti-democratic speech when they
met with him or her—for example, speech defending unjustifiable limits to freedom of
speech. According to the current objection, the prima facie duty of elected representa-
tives to receive information, ideas, or opinions does not extend to receiving informa-
tion, ideas, or opinions that are themselves anti-democratic.
However, it is not clear what should count as anti-democratic speech here. Suppose
the citizens are Muslims who wish to defend limiting freedom of speech when it comes
to group libels targeting religious believers. In theory, the argument from militant
democracy could also be deployed by these citizens as a justification for their calling
on politicians to introduce laws banning group libels targeting religious believers or to
further clarify the existing laws so that they cover cartoons depicting all Muslims as
terrorists, for example (Brown 2015, 194–201). Perhaps such cartoons could be viewed
as, directly, an attack on the reputation and equal standing of all Muslims and,
indirectly, contributing to a climate of Islamophobia that carries a clear and present
threat to fair and effective access to public discourse, and even to processes of
democratic decision-making, on the part of Muslims.
Another objection might be that the fundamental moral right to be heard seems
overbroad, for the simple reason that it gives people communicative rights over almost
any powerful government, whether or not it is their own. So, for example, the
fundamental moral right to be heard seems to imply that all, or nearly all, Mexicans
have a right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to the US government over its
plans to build a wall between the two countries.
However, our response is that both the fundamental moral right to be heard and the
duties it creates are qualified by reasonable constraints of feasibility and practicality.
Thus, in the case of noncitizens, the moral right to be heard can be understood as the
right of Mexicans to have their representatives make diplomatic representations to
foreign governments—for example, representations about US immigration policy made
by the Ambassador of Mexico to the US on behalf of Mexicans, in general. This means
that the rights of ambassadors are derivative of the fundamental moral cosmopolitan
rights of the people they represent. So according to this way of understanding what was
problematic about Rasmussen’s choice, it wronged the peoples of these countries and
only the ambassadors derivatively.
Another worry might be that the ambassadors did not in fact hold a right to be heard
by Rasmussen, concerning this matter, because he did not publish the cartoons. The
point is that even if one accepts for the sake of argument that the publication of the
cartoons had an adverse impact on the vital interests of individuals living in the eleven
predominantly Muslim countries whose ambassadors requested a meeting with Ras-
mussen,5 such as because the cartoons caused reputational damage to, or constituted a
form of misrecognition of, these Muslims, and even if one accepts that when the
ambassadors came forward they were acting in the name of or had been delegated to
speak for the interests of, these Muslims, the substantive issue remains whether they
5 It should also be noted that many resident Muslims in Denmark remain citizens of these countries.
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had a moral right to submit information, ideas, and opinions to Rasmussen, in addition
to the Danish newspaper involved.
In our view, this substantive issue depends not only on whether he wielded power to
take decisions that could have removed, mitigated, or lessened the relevant adverse
impact on their vital interests but also on whether there was reasonable disagreement
about whether Rasmussen held certain power. Moreover, even if Rasmussen was right
to say that he simply did not have the power to ‘take all those responsible to task under
law of the land’, this in itself does not foreclose the possibility that there were other
actions that Rasmussen did have the power to take. For example, he clearly had the
power to counter-speak against the cartoons, to publicly denounce them as biased
characterisations of the Prophet Muhammad and by association unfair generalizations
about Muslims in general. These statements could have improved or helped the vital
interests of Muslims both in Denmark and around the world—in relation to reducing
and mitigating forms of anti-Muslim discrimination, hostility, and cultural imperialism,
for example.
Alternatively, he could have simply made clear publicly that even though the
government was not responsible for the cartoons and he could not do anything about
them, he would not personally have published such cartoons and would not endorse the
cartoons. Perhaps had Rasmussen agreed to meet with the ambassadors—to make it
plain to them what he did not have the power to do—they would have then made
another request, namely, that he counter-speak against the cartoons or at the very least
make it clear that he would not endorse them.
Interestingly, back in October 2005, some of the ambassadors who had sent the
original letter were also publicly calling for Rasmussen to at least distance the state
from the cartoons and to reaffirm the incompatibility between the cartoons and
Denmark’s respect for Muslims. For example, Egypt’s Ambassador, Mona Omar
Attiah, is reported to have publicly stated the following on 27 October 2005:
It is a big misunderstanding when people think we have asked the Prime Minister
to put limits on freedom of speech. We wished for him to call for a responsible
and respectful use of this freedom. We also wished for him to take a moral
position by declaring that Danish society is striving for the integration, not the
demeaning, of Islam. (Comments quoted in Engelbreth Larsen 2010).
In this context, we also note that, within scholarly debates on hate speech, several
thinkers have argued that institutional authorities can, and should, play an active part as
counter-speakers against hate speech without becoming censors of hate speech or
advocating the censorship of hate speech (Strossen 1990, 562; 2001, 272; 2012,
387–388, 392; Gelber 2002, 2012; Brettschneider 2013, 642; Lepoutre 2017).
Nevertheless, at this stage, it might be objected that Rasmussen’s letter of reply to
the ambassadors counted as engagement with their views. In other words, simply by
reading the ambassadors’ letter and replying to it he respected their moral right to be
heard. We think that there is an element of truth in this objection but that it is not
decisive. In fact, the ambassadors’ letter was partly a request for Rasmussen to take
action and partly a request for a meeting to enable the ambassadors to express their
views to him in full and in person. Rasmussen’s letter of reply dealt with the former, but
not the latter, since he did not, and could not, have anticipated what those views would
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be. As such, we believe that at best, Rasmussen only partially respected the ambassa-
dors’ moral right to be heard by writing the letter of reply he did.
Now the objector might insist that, even if one accepts that the ambassadors had a
right to submit a lengthier set of ideas or arguments to Rasmussen than were contained
in their original, brief letter, this did not create a duty on the part of Rasmussen to meet
with them in person, in the way the ambassadors requested. Perhaps their right to be
heard would have been met, given constraints of feasibility and practicality, by their
submitting a longer written statement and by Rasmussen responding to that statement
with an official reply.
We accept this line of reasoning, up to a point. If, at the time, Rasmussen had set
forth a pressing practical reason for not meeting the ambassadors in person, but, in
addition, had offered to receive and respond to a longer written statement from them,
then this would have upheld their rights, we believe. However, Rasmussen set forth no
such reason and made no such offer. In fact, Rasmussen’s publicly stated reason for
refusing to meet the ambassadors in person to hear their concerns in full (or at length)
was that there was no point, because the substantive debate was settled. This, we argue
expressed disregard for the moral right to be heard of the ambassadors, and of all those
Muslims they represented. By both refusing to meet with the ambassadors in person
and failing to offer to receive their full ideas and arguments in some other way,
Rasmussen demonstrated an unwillingness to engage with them at all. This unwilling-
ness, along with Rasmussen’s stated reason for not meeting, showed that he did not
adequately respect their right to be heard.
To be clear, we have not here attempted to provide a full specification of what the
right to submit information consists in, which would include specification of the full
range of correlative moral duties, and of mitigating practical considerations that might
outweigh such duties or excuse the failure to act on them under certain circumstances.
A comprehensive theory would have to address such issues.
Importantly, a comprehensive theory would also need to consider potentially
countervailing moral duties of a pressing or urgent kind that might trump the obligation
to meaningfully hear information, ideas, and opinions from affected persons. For
example, the obligation to meaningfully hear might be superseded or overpowered
by an obligation not to give a platform to encourage or otherwise recognize and support
the political agenda of people who egregiously reject liberal democratic norms (i.e.
where there is little or no room for reasonable disagreement). This is unlike the political
agenda of the ambassadors from Muslim countries, which either support or acknowl-
edge the right to freedom of expression in more qualified ways and which are not
necessarily entirely illiberal in their approach to free speech (and where there is plenty
of room for reasonable disagreement).
Suppose, for instance, Rasmussen had refused to meet a delegation of Danish
citizens who support violent far right politics—or even a delegation of ambassadors
from countries with violent far right governments—who wanted to call on the Prime
Minister to strip all Danish Muslims of their citizenship, to use violent anti-protest
tactics and detention without trial against Muslim protestors in Denmark and even to
impose economic sanctions on, boycott all trade with, and, if necessary, bomb, Muslim
countries involved in the international protests against the Danish cartoons. In such a
case, Rasmussen’s obligation to send an expressive or symbolic message of liberal
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values and intercultural peace and tolerance, communicated by his refusal to meet these
delegations, would supersede any obligation to meet them.
Indeed, the delegations in this hypothetical case may have significantly less political
legitimacy and moral authority to speak for, or represent, ‘the people’ than the Muslim
ambassadors in the Danish cartoons affair. Consequently, an obligation to meaningfully
hear them may not be triggered in the first instance.
However, to repeat, our aim has not been to offer a full theory of rights and
obligations but to suggest that something like the fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral
right to be meaningfully heard is needed to account for the initial intuition about
Rasmussen’s choice.
Recent Developments and Implications
We have argued that Rasmussen’s unwillingness to discursively engage with the
ambassadors—to receive their ideas and perspectives in person and in full (or at
length)—and for the reason he provided, constituted a partial violation of a fundamen-
tal (cosmopolitan) moral right to be meaningfully heard on the part of those millions of
Muslims the ambassadors sought to represent. In grounding moral criticism of
Rasmussen’s choice in this way, we are not claiming that Rasmussen was guilty of
subverting freedom of speech—for example, he did not explicitly call on others to
refuse to meet the ambassadors, and he did not attempt to censor or expel the
ambassadors. Nor are we claiming a crude moral equivalence between refusing to meet
with the ambassadors and censoring the ambassadors.
In this final section, we trace some recent developments in the Danish cartoons
controversy and address some implications. First, we note that Rasmussen’s refusal to
meet with the ambassadors was at the time accompanied with calls for more ‘dialogue’
with Muslims, as exemplified with the government’s own diplomatic initiative ‘Part-
nership for Progress and Reform’ directed at the Arab world. We would argue that such
initiatives much better reflect what it would mean to respect the right to be heard on the
part of Muslims in the wake of the Danish cartoons controversy.
Second, when Rasmussen originally refused to meet with the ambassadors, and
declined to offer an official apology for the cartoons, part of his justification was that he
was defending the importance of freedom of speech in general, but at the same time, he,
and his government, was not endorsing any specific utterances or expressions, such as
the cartoons, protected by it. Indeed, in 2009, Rasmussen took up the post of Nato
secretary general and whilst still refusing to apologize for the cartoons—despite
pressure from Turkey to do so—he did say, ‘I was deeply distressed that the cartoons
were seen by many Muslims as an attempt by Denmark to mark and insult or behave
disrespectfully toward Islam or the Prophet Mohammad’ (Butler and Yackley 2009).
The Danish government’s attempt to draw a line between upholding free speech
whilst not endorsing the symbolism of the cartoons has subsequently been challenged,
however. In September 2017, Inger Støjberg, then minister for immigration and
integration in the Danish government also led by Rasmussen’s former party (the liberal
party), published the most controversial of the Jyllands-Posten cartoons on her
Facebook page. Her justification accompanying the picture was that she loved the
foundation of liberty rights, including most prominently freedom of expression, on
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which Danish society is based. She also added, ‘we should be proud of the Mohammad
cartoons’ (The Independent 2017). Støjberg thereby went directly against Rasmussen’s
original line of argument, according to which the publication had nothing to do with the
government and did not reflect his or the government’s own view. Støjberg instead
makes the cartoons her own by actively republishing the most controversial one of
them herself, and endorsing them by saying that Danes should be proud of them. This
development is perhaps even more regrettable than Rasmussen’s choice. It is arguable
that those in positions of power, especially the government, have a responsibility to
avoid (unwittingly) sending out messages that certain opinions are simply not worthy
of public debate. Not only do Støjberg’s statements dissolve the distinction between
defending freedom of speech and actually endorsing the cartoons—a distinction that
may have somewhat mitigated the problematic nature of Rasmussen’s choice—but they
also send out a message that potentially damages values of civic dignity and cultural
recognition, not least the equal standing of Muslims in Danish society (Brown 2015,
chs 5 and 6).
Third, it is important to see the unfolding international controversy surrounding the
cartoons as part of a much wider discussion about the human right to freedom of
expression and how that right might be qualified under international law. For example,
some Muslim states, like Turkey, extend the meaning of hate speech to include not
merely defamation of Muslims but defamation of the Muslim religion (Brown and
Sinclair 2020, 79–81). Moreover, at the international level, with the backing of the
OIC, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) introduced the first resolution
on defamation of religions back in 1999, and similar resolutions were made periodi-
cally over the following decade (ibid, 172). However, the USA, especially under the
Obama administration, has worked hard to reassert within international law a firm
distinction between anti-Muslim hate speech and speech (or cartoons) that constitute
defamation of the Muslim religion (ibid, 172–174, 194–195). In this way, Rasmussen
was anticipating, to some extent, shifts in international law that would come later.
Fourth, in Rasmussen’s subsequent interviews on Al Arabiya and similar appear-
ances, he came very close to issuing an apology in the interest of easing the interna-
tional pressure on Denmark. He evidently gave one impression of his views when
facing a domestic audience and another when trying to do international damage control.
On one possible reading, this is an example of a statesperson operating, even if
implicitly, a sort of calculus balancing a cultural commitment to promoting and
defending free speech norms, on the one hand, and against other considerations and
values such as international peace and stability, on the other hand. But what is still
missing is the recognition of the importance of cosmopolitan deliberative and commu-
nicative considerations and the obligation to receive information, ideas and arguments
from persons affected by one’s decisions, even if they live in other parts of the world.
Fifth, it deserves mention that even if Rasmussen had agreed to meet with the
ambassadors, and thereby made a different choice, arguably, he would have been
confronted with another, no less difficult freedom of speech dilemma: namely, whether
or not to release details about the discussion to the public. On the one hand, this would
have created (on one possible reading of the situation) an opportunity for Danish
citizens to observe a collision of truth with error and, therefore, an opportunity for
them to acquire a clearer perception and livelier impression of truth. On the other hand,
it is not clear that had a meeting taken place between Rasmussen and the ambassadors it
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would have been normal or agreeable for the sides to release a recording or transcript of
the meeting to the public. Successful (as opposed to unsuccessful) diplomacy typically
goes on behind closed doors: the diplomatic practice or convention of keeping some
sensitive conversations out of the public domain can serve the political interests of all
concerned. And so, in the interests of the art of diplomacy perhaps the only realistic
choice before Rasmussen, from his own political perspective, was whether to meet the
ambassadors in private or not to meet them at all.
Finally, we have said that international diplomacy often happens behind closed
doors and for good reasons. But does this create a problem for the idea that ambassa-
dors are the appropriate agents to represent people from other countries so as to ensure
that their fundamental moral right to be heard is respected. Some people might assume
that in order for that right to be properly respected, a condition of publicity must be
satisfied: people must have knowledge of the way in which their information, ideas,
and opinions have been interpreted, presented, and defended by their representatives. If
so, then the secrecy of diplomacy potentially makes ambassadors inappropriate repre-
sentatives, such that we might need to think of other ways for the voices of noncitizens
to be heard.
However, we would argue that it is perfectly possible for ambassadors to meet the
demands of publicity when speaking to those they represent, whilst at the same time
conducting diplomacy itself behind closed doors. The twin purposes can be served, we
believe, through the convention of diplomats, on the one hand, giving interviews to the
media prior to holding international talks, and then holding press conferences, and
sometimes even joint press conferences, after the talks, in which they issue a common
statement about what was discussed and answer a few questions from the press about
the same,6 but, on the other hand, holding the talks themselves in private and not
releasing recordings or transcripts of those meetings.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Ammitzbøll P and Vidino L (2007) After the Danish cartoon controversy. Middle East Quarterly 14: 3–11.
http://www.meforum.org/1437/after-the-danish-cartoon-controversy (accessed 26 June 2020).
Belay G (1997) Ethics in international interaction: perspectives on diplomacy and negotiation. In: Casmir FL
(ed.) Ethics in intercultural and international communication. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
6 Joint press conferences require that the parties have reached sufficient agreement to enable a joint statement,
which is not always the case. Interestingly, an example of disagreement played out during the Danish cartoons
controversy, when the then Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Copenhagen and refused
to appear together with Rasmussen after their meeting on the grounds that Rasmussen had not banned a
Kurdish television station from operating from Copenhagen.
Cosmopolitan Democratic and Communicative Rights: The Danish...
Brettschneider C (2013) Value democracy as the basis for viewpoint neutrality: A theory of free speech and its
implications for the state speech and limited public forum doctrines. Northwestern University Law Review
107: 603–645.
Brown A (2010) On the public reason of the society of peoples. Public Reason 2: 43–60.
Brown A (2015) Hate speech law: a philosophical examination. New York: Routledge.
Brown A and Sinclair A (2020) The politics of hate speech laws. London: Routledge.
Butler D and Yackley AJ (2009) New NATO chief pledges conciliation with Muslims, Reuters, 6 April.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-rasmussen/new-nato-chief-pledges-conciliation-with-muslims-
idUSTRE5351GU20090406 (accessed 26 June 2020).
Cole J (2006) All cartoon politics are local. The Salon, 9 February. Available at: https://www.salon.com/2006
/02/09/culture_3/ (accessed 29 June 2020).
Dryzek J (2000) Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, contestations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dryzek JS et al. (2019) Deliberative global governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Engelbreth Larsen R (2010) The Danish cartoon affair. Counterpunch, 24 September. Available at:
https://www.counterpunch.org/2010/09/24/the-danish-cartoon-affair/ (accessed 30 June 2020).
European Union, Directorate-General for Internal Policies (2015) The right to petition. European Union,
Brussels. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519223/IPOL_STU(2015
)519223_EN.pdf (accessed 26 June 2020).
Fraser N (2007) Transnationalizing the public sphere: on the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion in a
post-Westphalian world. Theory, Culture and Society 24: 7–30.
Gelber K (2002) Speaking back: The free speech versus hate speech debate. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing.
Gelber K (2012) “Speaking back”: The likely fate of hate speech policy in the United States and Australia. In
Maitra I and McGowan M (eds.) Speech and harm: controversies over free speech. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Gilabert P (2006) Cosmopolitanism and discourse ethics: a critical survey. New Political Science 28: 1–21.
Goodin R (2007) Enfranchising all-affected interests, and its alternatives. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35:
40–68.
Gould C (2006) Self-determination beyond sovereignty: relating transnational democracy to local autonomy.
Journal of Social Philosophy 37: 44–60.
Habermas J (1996) Between facts and norms, W. Regh (trans.). Cambridge MA: Polity Press.
Held D (2005) Democratic accountability and political effectiveness from a cosmopolitan perspective. In:
Held D and Koenig-Archibugi M (eds.) Global governance and public accountability. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing.
Higginson SA (1986) A short history of the right to petition government for the redress of grievances. Yale
Law Journal 96: 142–166.
Independent The (2017) Denmark’s immigration minister uses cartoon of Prophet Mohammad as iPad
b a c k g r o u n d . Th e I n d e p e n d e n t , 2 6 S e p t emb e r . h t t p : / /www . i n d e p e n d e n t . c o .
uk/news/world/europe/denmark-immigration-minister-prophet-mohammad-ipad-background-inger-
stojberg-a7968121.html (accessed 26 June 2020).
Keohane R (2003) Global governance and democratic accountability. In: Held D and Koenig-Archibugi M
(eds.) Taming globalization: frontiers of governance. Cambridge MA: Polity Press.
Klausen J (2009) The cartoons that shook the world. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Krotoszynski RJ (2012) Reclaiming the petition clause: seditious libel, “offensive” protest, and the right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lægaard S (2007) The cartoon controversy: offence, identity, oppression? Political Studies 55: 481–498.
Lægaard S (2012) Unequal recognition, misrecognition and injustice: the case of religious minorities in
Denmark. Ethnicities 12: 197–214.
Lægaard S (2013) Danish anti-multiculturalism? the significance of the political framing of diversity. In:
Kivisto P and Wahlbeck Ö (eds.) Debating multiculturalism in the Nordic welfare states. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Lepoutre M (2017) Hate speech in public discourse: A pessimistic defense of counterspeech. Social Theory
and Practice 43: 851–883.
Loewenstein K (1937a) Militant democracy and fundamental rights I. American Political Science Review 31:
417–432.
Loewenstein K (1937b) Militant democracy and fundamental rights II. American Political Science Review 31:
638–658.
A. Brown, S. Lægaard
Macdonald T (2008) Global stakeholder democracy: power and representation beyond liberal states. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Moore M (2006) Globalization and democratization: institutional design for global institutions. Journal of
Social Philosophy 37: 21–43.
Mulinari D et al. (2016) Introduction: postcolonialism and the Nordic models of welfare and gender. In:
Keskinen S et al. (eds.) Complying with colonialism: gender, race and ethnicity in the Nordic region.
London: Routledge.
Näsström S (2003) What globalization overshadows. Political Theory 31: 808–834.
Näsström S (2011) The challenge of the all-affected principle. Political Studies 59: 116–134.
Pogge T (2008) World poverty and human rights, second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Porter T (2012) Rawls, Reasonableness, and International Toleration. Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 11:
382–414.
Rawls J (1999) The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rose F (2005) Muhammeds ansigt [‘The Face of Mohammad’] Jyllands-Posten, 30 September
(Kulturweekend, 3).
Rossow R (1962) The professionalization of the new diplomacy. World Politics 14: 561–575.
Shapiro I (1999) Democratic justice. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Smith W (2011) Deliberation beyond borders: the public reason of a society of peoples. Journal of
International Political Theory 7: 117–139.
Steffek J (2010) Public accountability and the public sphere of international governance. Ethics and
International Affairs 24: 45–67.
Strossen N (1990) Regulating racist speech on campus: a modest proposal.Duke Law Journal 1990: 484–573.
Strossen N (2001) Incitement to hatred: should there be a limit? Southern Illinois University Law Journal 25:
243–279.
Strossen N (2012) Interview. In: Herz M and Molnar P (eds) The content and context of hate speech:
Rethinking regulation and responses. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Times The (2006) 70,000 Gather for violent Pakistan cartoons protest. The Time, 15 February. Available at:
http://www.pakpassion.net/ppforum/archive/index.php/t-18227.html (accessed 29 June 2020).
Waldron J (2010) Dignity and defamation: The visibility of hate. Harvard Law Review 123: 1596–657.
Williams J (2017) War and global public reason. Utilitas 29: 398–422.
Wolff J (2009) Global justice and norms of co-operation: the “layers of justice” view. In: de Wijze S et al.
(eds.) Hillel Steiner and the anatomy of justice: themes and challenges. London: Routledge.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cosmopolitan Democratic and Communicative Rights: The Danish...
